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1. Introduction 
The “fiscal theory of the price level” (FTPL; Woodford, 1995 and 2001) 
marks the revival of interest for fiscal policy, after the long blackout that followed 
the crisis of Keynesian economics. Among the causes of this revival, an important 
role was played by the dramatic drop in US public debt during the Clinton 
presidency. The reduced stock of bonds in the hands of households led researchers 
to re-investigate the relationship between consumption, the government 
intertemporal budget constraint, wealth effects and monetary policy. As we will 
argue below, the attempts to give empirical support to the FTPL – that had its 
theoretical precursors in the work of Leeper (1991) and Sims (1994) among others –, 
have been rather unsuccessful so far, so that its main merit lies in the fact that it 
brought back into the debate the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy and 
its effects on the level of activity and on prices. 
One of the consequences of this resurgence of interest is a small but growing 
literature that tries to isolate and quantify the effects of fiscal policy shocks. With a 
few notable exceptions, most of this literature finds Keynesian effects of 
discretionary fiscal shocks. This result is particularly interesting when related to 
European countries because it introduces an element of complexity in the debate 
linked to the European institutional setting and, in particular, to the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). In fact, the ineffectiveness (and even the harmfulness) of 
discretionary fiscal policy is one of theoretical foundations of the original 
institutional setting (the balanced-budget-over-the-cycle feature of the SGP), that 
only allows for automatic stabilization in “bad times”. If we are unable to rule out 
effects on output of discretionary fiscal policy, the main reason for restricting 
government action to automatic stabilization drops, and the debate on European 
economic “governance” can be looked at from a different perspective. The 
modifications of the SGP adopted in March 2005 are quite interesting in this respect. 
They extend the “exceptional circumstances” to slow growth and the relevant factors 
that can justify that the limit of the 3 per cent of GDP has not been enforced. 
Nevertheless, the “new SGP” still involves a deficit limit that heavily constrains the 
————— 
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scope for discretionary policy, so long as budget deficits will not have converged 
towards zero. 
Our paper aims at investigating the empirics of fiscal and monetary policies 
in France within a precise theoretical framework and, meanwhile, to shed light on 
the current debate regarding the optimality, necessity and drawbacks of the SGP. We 
take our motivation in particular from the papers of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
and of Biau and Girard (forthcoming) who constitutes an application of the former 
to France. Both papers find Keynesian effects of structural shocks to fiscal policy. 
The objective of this paper is twofold: First, it constitutes a robustness test for the 
results of Biau and Girard, in that we try to apply their methodology to a different, 
more complex, theoretical framework. Second, the structural VAR that we test is 
constructed to embed the main features of the FTPL (notably the interaction of 
wealth effects linked to the stock of debt, and the interaction of fiscal and monetary 
reaction functions), that are also used as the theoretical assumptions behind 
identification: one objective of the paper is to test the underlying theory. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses the literature 
that is related to this paper, both the theoretical research on the fiscal theory of the 
price level, and the literature on structural VAR and fiscal policy. In Section 3 we 
start with a simple theoretical model that sketches the channels by which fiscal 
policy changes affect output and prices. We then present the VAR model, and 
discuss the identification procedure that has been used, together with main 
underlying assumptions. Section 4 describes the dataset, and contains a detailed 
discussion concerning the issue of quarterly public finance data. Section 5 presents 
the results. Even though they are obtained within a different theoretical framework, 
the findings confirm the “Keynesian story” already highlighted by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) for the US and by Biau and Girard (forthcoming) for France. Quite 
unusually within this strand of the literature, the impact of a monetary shock is also 
presented. Finally, as a side result, main findings also seem to give support to the 
FTPL predictions that a fiscal shock should have a positive impact on prices. 
Section 5 presents some robustness checks. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
2.1 The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) 
The renewal of interest in favor of expansionary fiscal policy can be traced 
back to the development of the fiscal theory of the price level in the early Nineties.1 
Before that, mainstream literature had endeavored to show that expansionary fiscal 
policies would either harm the price stability objective of a “conservative” central 
banker (Barro and Gordon, 1983; Rogoff, 1985), or induce a steep rise in private 
savings (along the lines of the so-called Ricardian equivalence principle, see 
————— 
1 Comprehensive surveys related to the roots of the FTPL can be found in Creel and Sterdyniak (2001) and 
Woodford (2001). 
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Barro, 1974), or induce, quite unexpectedly, a mix of the two previous effects that 
would lead to a contractionary impact on real GDP2 (see Giavazzi and Pagano, 
1990; Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano, 2000), or provoke higher long-term interest 
rates (the so-called “crowding-out effects”).3 
In comparison with this overwhelming literature, the FTPL focuses on the 
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies. The main message of the FTPL is 
that there are two different mechanisms that enable the ex ante satisfaction of the 
government present-value budget constraint, i.e. this budget constraint is not viewed 
as an identity but as an equilibrium condition.4 In the first case, the fiscal authority 
adjusts its future spending and taxes so that they meet the constraint for any value of 
the interest rate and the nominal income. 
In the second case – the FTPL case –, the fiscal authority does not act in 
accordance with the fulfillment of its budget constraint, so that it is the “task” of the 
price level to ensure equilibrium. The FTPL thus states that the government can 
exogenously set its real spending and revenue plans, and that the price level will 
take on the value required to adjust the real value of its contractual nominal debt 
obligations to ensure government solvency. This theory hence emphasizes that the 
price level is able to “jump” in relation to the government present value budget 
constraint. The allocation of instruments to targets in this case can be totally 
reversed from that chosen in the EU. 
Although Woodford (2001) argues in favor of the Maastricht public finances 
criteria, his theoretical framework may be seen as a contradiction to the current EU 
institutional and macroeconomic setting. His model shows that the situation of 
governments as followers vis-à-vis the European Central Bank (ECB) could be 
reversed without disturbing the steady state. With governments acting as leaders in 
the strategic policy game with the ECB, general equilibrium would only necessitate 
a less reactive monetary policy vis-à-vis inflation deviations from target than that 
ensuing from the application of a usual “monetary Taylor rule”.5 
But does the FTPL works “in real life”? Tests by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba 
(2001) showed that the FTPL was invalidated by the data in the US. More recently, 
————— 
2 The Barro and Gordon (1983) and the Barro (1974) stories are inconsistent with each other: the former 
states that active policies would change the domestic inflation rate, at full employment; whereas the latter 
states that active fiscal policies have no impact on an economy at full employment: higher savings just 
matches higher public investment (or expenditures). 
3 The plausibility of these four effects is investigated both theoretically and empirically in 
Creel et al. (2004). 
4 The main message of Buiter (2002) is that the FTPL is flawed in this respect. The response of Woodford 
(2001) is that the budget constraint is still satisfied ex post and does not contradict the identity. This 
controversy is beyond the scope of this paper, as the macroeconomic framework that will be used is more 
about flows than about stocks. As demonstrated by Niepelt (2004), such a framework establishes a link 
between fiscal policy and the price level, but unlike Niepelt we consider that this alternative – in our case, 
macroeconomic – framework to the FTPL goes beyond the conclusions of Sargent and Wallace (1981) in 
that it incorporates a wealth effect (absent from Sargent and Wallace) that makes old-fashioned unrealistic 
money debt financing unnecessary to solve the model. 
5 This is the theoretical conclusion of Leeper (1991). 
644 Jérôme Creel, Paola Monperrus-Veroni and Francesco Saraceno 
 
Creel and Le Bihan (2006) have extended their work to European countries. Based 
upon a modified VAR analysis that makes a distinction between cyclically-adjusted 
and non-cyclically-adjusted deficits, they have shown that the FTPL was also 
invalidated in these countries. 
Although these results seem to cast doubts on the empirical relevance of the 
FTPL, they do not diminish the usefulness of the theory: renewing the interest for 
fiscal policy aimed at stabilization, for wealth effects, for public debt and for the 
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies within a common framework is 
largely enough to gain consideration. Moreover, as we show in Section 5, the FTPL 
would gain support for France within our SVAR identification. 
 
2.2 Structural VARs and the analysis of discretionary fiscal policy effects 
The long-lasting debate on the effects of fiscal policy on GDP and other 
macroeconomic variables has struggled with the methodological issue of correctly 
identifying such a policy. First, as argued by Creel and Sterdyniak (1995), and also 
more recently by Galí and Perotti (2003), the existing measures of structural and 
cyclical deficits do not correctly deal with a functional classification of public 
expenditure and revenues. For instance, the cyclically-adjusted deficit usually 
incorporates interest payments, although they may originate in past cyclical 
downturns that have provoked higher overall deficits. Second, difficulties arise in 
isolating the effects of discretionary policy on economic activity from other effects 
at work, as for example the change in interest rate payments, automatic stabilization, 
and so on. Thus, until very recently, no serious attempt had been made to assess the 
effects of fiscal policy shocks on the economy. 
The development of SVAR models, originally conceived for the analysis of 
monetary policy (Bernanke, 1986; Blanchard and Watson, 1986; were among the 
first ones), has initiated a relatively small body of literature that in the past years has 
tried to look into this issue.6  The first paper, by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), 
investigates the United States, and obtains identification by imposing 
contemporaneous restrictions based on the institutional features of the tax and 
expenditure system.7 Such a method allows the authors to isolate the effects of fiscal 
policy shocks on GDP and its components. Their estimates are broadly consistent 
with standard textbook Keynesian analysis, in that positive public expenditure 
shocks, and negative tax shocks have significant and positive effects on GDP and 
consumption. These results are nevertheless mitigated by the effects on investment 
that are instead negative for expenditure increases and positive for tax reductions, 
————— 
6 Here we do not discuss other identification schemes (all applied to the US) such as the “narrative 
approach” (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher, 1999; Burnside, Eichenbaum 
and Fisher, 2004); that identify the VAR by means of well-known exogenous fiscal episodes; or the “sign 
restriction” approach, in which the sign of impulse responses is pre-imposed on the basis of theoretical 
priors (Mountford and Uhlig, 2002; Canova and Pappa, 2003). 
7 The authors also use dummies to take into account large shocks (as the temporary tax cut of 1975). 
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results that are more consistent with variants of the neoclassical model. Similar 
results are obtained by Fatás and Mihov (2001), who focus on public expenditures, 
and show that GDP, employment and consumption react positively to expansionary 
fiscal policy shocks. Their identification procedure however is relatively more 
standard, and ranks fiscal shocks first in the Choleski decomposition; the authors 
conclude that their empirical findings are at odds with a number of versions of Real 
Business Cycles models, while they concord with the predictions of a standard 
textbook IS-LM model. 
Most of the existing literature on the effects of fiscal policy deals with the 
US. Among the few papers using the SVAR methodology and dealing with other 
countries we can cite two that are directly related to our work. The first, by Biau and 
Girard (forthcoming), replicates Blanchard and Perotti with French data. 8  The 
conclusions are also similar, making the case for Keynesian results. The short term 
impact of fiscal policy is expansionary and larger than one; as was the case for the 
US, this result passes through positive effects on private consumption. An increase 
in tax receipts, on the other hand, has weak effects, even if the sign is negative as 
expected in a Keynesian framework. The difference with the US data as reported by 
Blanchard and Perotti is explained by the different estimated elasticity of tax 
receipts to GDP: whereas Blanchard and Perotti use a value of 2, Biau and Girard 
opt for a value of 0.8. The main difference between these two values stems from the 
elasticity of employment to GDP, which is four times lower in Biau and Girard than 
in Blanchard and Perotti. In this respect, Biau and Girard mention that the quarterly 
elasticity of tax receipts to GDP in Blanchard and Perotti is relatively close to that 
estimated in the US with annual data. Finally, they also include an innovation with 
respect to Blanchard and Perotti in that they explicitly consider monetary policy, 
with the inclusion of the interest rate in the VAR. Doing so, they are closer to Perotti 
(2004). Nevertheless, in their paper the interest rate is shown to have only negligible 
effects on fiscal multipliers. 
Perotti (2004) also considers monetary policy, and extends the framework to 
five OECD countries.9 He finds results contrasting with those reported above. The 
evidence of an important structural break around 1980, for all the countries, allows 
drawing a number of conclusions. First, GDP effects of expansionary fiscal policy 
are limited, and the multiplier is larger than one only in one case (the US before 
1980). In general, the effects of fiscal policy have weakened over time, to the point 
of becoming significantly negative in a number of cases in the post-1980 period. 
Second, tax cuts and spending increases do not emerge as having significantly 
different effects. This conclusion contrasts with the findings of Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) that expenditures cuts are better than tax hikes when a fiscal contraction is 
————— 
8 The German and Italian cases were also investigated, respectively by Mohr (2002) and 
Giordano et al. (2005). 
9 USA, West Germany, UK, Canada, Australia. According to the author, for the other countries the quality 
of data at quarterly frequency is too low to permit a meaningful analysis. As explained at length in 
Section 4 below, we believe that the quality of French quarterly data is good enough to perform this type 
of analysis. 
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under way. Third, while interest rates were substantially unaffected in the pre-1980 
period, the effect of fiscal policy shocks became positive in the most recent period. 
This reaction of interest rates to changes in fiscal variables explains the weaker and 
often negative impact on GDP that can be observed after 1980. The author explains 
the difference with the original Blanchard and Perotti results by the division in two 
sub-samples. And in fact, he argues, when taking the whole sample the results are in 
line with most of the existing literature. Perotti concludes arguing that neither the 
neoclassical nor the Keynesian (or New-Keynesian) models are successful in 
explaining this complex set of findings. 
 
3. Model and methodology 
3.1 A simple model of price determination 
In this section we present a very simple model of an economy in which debt 
and the price level are related via the fiscal and the monetary authorities’ behaviors. 
The model is a macroeconomic version of the FTPL quite close to that developed by 
Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) and is borrowed from Creel and Sterdyniak (2002). 
The first equation is an aggregate demand relationship (all variables are real; 
fiscal variables are expressed in percent of GDP): 
 
1 ,y cy r b t sδ ϕ−= − + + −  (1) 
where real debt affects demand positively (due to a wealth effect), the real interest 
rate has a negative influence on demand, and public expenditure is written as the 
difference between tax receipts and primary surplus, g t s= − . 
Aggregate supply is standard, and relates inflation to the level of output: 
 *
1 ( )y ypi pi ν−= + −  (2) 
Real debt cumulates according to the law of motion: 
 
1 (1 )b b r s−= + −  (3) 
Finally, the last two equations define the reaction functions of fiscal and 
monetary authorities: 
 * *( )s s h b b= + −  (4) 
and: 
 * * *( ) ( )r r y yα pi pi β= + − + −  (5) 
Equation (4) states that the fiscal authority reacts to deviations of debt from 
its steady state value, while equation (5) is a standard Taylor rule relation if α  is 
positive (hence an inflationary shock would provoke a rise in the real interest rate). 
If both fiscal and monetary policies are active in contrasting inflation (large 
α ) and increases in debt (large h), prices are under the control of the monetary 
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authority and fiscal solvency is guaranteed by fiscal policy. Given that fiscal policy 
responds strongly to debt deviations, expansionary fiscal shocks will be followed by 
a fiscal restriction of the same size in present discounted value to stabilize debt, and 
as a consequence equilibrium is restored through larger surpluses. 
If debt and inflation do not trigger reaction from fiscal and monetary 
authorities (small h and α ), the intertemporal balance of the budget and fiscal 
solvency will be guaranteed by price changes, the typical FTPL mechanism: an 
expansionary fiscal shock will stimulate aggregate demand through wealth effects.10 
This in turn drives prices up, inflation deflates the stock of nominal debt and there is 
no need for corrections in the surplus process. 
Thus, in the latter framework, debt, the price level and the instruments of 
fiscal and monetary policies are linked by a set of complex relationships. The 
structural VAR that we present in the next paragraph tries to look into these 
relationships. 
 
3.2 The 5-variable VAR and the identification assumptions 
Our starting point is a canonical VAR in five variables: primary surplus, net 
debt (both expressed in percent of GDP), real GDP growth (expressed in percent), 
the inflation rate (computed as the first difference in the log of the CPI), and the 
short term interest rate: 
 ( ) t tL= + +t tY A Y X β u  (6) 
where [ , , , , ] 't t t t t ts b y rpi=Y  is the vector of endogenous variables, while tX  is a 
vector of exogenous variables, notably the German interest rate, a Maastricht 
dummy, and an interaction variable taking care of the interest rate convergence after 
1993. Data are quarterly and go from 1978:1 to 2003:4. A detailed description of the 
variables and of the sources is given in Section 4 below. 
After performing a sequential LR test on the VAR, taking 8 quarters as a lag 
maximum, we found 5 lags to be the optimum. In this our model does not depart 
from that of Biau and Girard. What is different is our choice of performing a VAR 
in level, with variables that are non stationary: the ratio of public debt to GDP, the 
inflation and interest rates. Doing this, we follow Sims’ (1980) recommendation 
against differencing even if the variables contain unit roots because the goal of a 
VAR analysis is to determine the inter-relationships among the variables, not to 
determine estimates. As reported in Sims, Stock and Watson (1990), VARs with non 
stationary variables incur some loss in estimators’ efficiency without any costs in 
————— 
10 In this sketchy and pedagogical version of the model we abstract from expectations that of course play a 
crucial role in the FTPL. See Creel and Sterdyniak (2002) for a more complete description of the model 
and of its stability conditions. Creel and Sterdyniak notably show that in the case of backward-looking 
expectations, the FTPL is incompatible with Ricardian consumers. Interestingly, this conclusion is similar 
to that of Niepelt (2004) although it is obtained in a very different setting: for the FTPL to function, Creel 
and Sterdyniak argue that a wealth effect is required whereas Niepelt argue that “surprise inflation” is. 
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terms of estimators’ consistency. In the present case, another – economic – reason 
lies at the heart of our methodological choice: with a stationary primary surplus and 
a public debt on GDP having a unit root, we would have to take the latter in first 
difference and include two indicators of the fiscal stance in the VAR: the primary 
surplus and the government overall surplus. Economically, this would largely depart 
from the theoretical background, implying a loss of information. 
Consistently with our priors, two exogenous variables (the German interest 
rate and its interaction with the Maastricht dummy) are significant for the interest 
rate equation (results not reported). These exogenous variables capture the influence 
of German monetary policy on the estimated monetary reaction function of France, 
when the two countries were members of the European Monetary System. 
The residuals of the canonical VAR are uninformative on the response of 
endogenous variables to shocks; to obtain response functions meaningful for the 
analysis of economic policy we need to isolate structural shocks. Thus, while the 
canonical residual of, say, the primary surplus collects information on all the 
unexpected movements of the variable, the corresponding structural residual is 
obtained by eliminating all feedback mechanism (automatic or discretionary) 
triggered by changes in the other variables. Thus, the structural residual will be 
interpreted as an autonomous, discretionary shock, whose effects on the other 
variables can be examined by means of the impulse response functions (IRF). 
The procedure originally suggested by Sims (1980) to pass from canonical to 
structural innovations, a triangularization of the residual covariance matrix, was 
soon criticized as being arbitrary and difficult to justify from an economic 
viewpoint. Structural VARs, originally proposed by Shapiro and Watson (1988), 
aim at substituting this identification procedure with one that has sounder roots, in 
the sense that the constraints on the variance matrix of residuals stem from 
economic behavior. Specifically, Shapiro and Watson, like Blanchard and Quah 
(1989) shortly after, impose long run restrictions by assuming that only supply 
shocks have permanent effects. The identification here, following Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), is instead based on restrictions in the contemporaneous correlation 
matrix. In particular, Blanchard and Perotti use the institutional features of the 
American tax system to impose constraints to the matrix. If we write the relationship 
between canonical ( tu ) and structural ( tε ) residuals as: 
 
1 t 2 t
M u = M ε  (7) 
The identification procedure consists in imposing constraints on the elements 
of the two matrices that allow writing: 
 -1
t 2 1 tε = M M u  (8) 
The system of equations that has been used to build the matrices M1 and M2 
is the following (the time subscript is omitted, as we only deal with 
contemporaneous relationships, and all the variables are indexed by t): 
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s sb b sy y s
b b br r bs s b
y ys s yb b y yr r y
y y
r ry y r r
u u u e
u u u e e
u u u u u e
u u e
u u u e
pi pi
pi pi
pi pi pi
pi pi
α α
α α β
γ γ γ γ
γ
γ γ
= + +
= + + +
= + + + +
= +
= + +
 (9) 
The model (9) replicates the theoretical model presented above (equations 1 
to 5). Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we identify the two matrices M1 and 
M2 in three steps: 
• the first step consists in estimating contemporaneous elasticities that relate 
unexpected shocks within the same quarter, when the institutional features of the 
system are such that discretionary reactions may be excluded (for which, in other 
words, we can safely assume that regressors and residuals are uncorrelated). 
Thus, if we assume that policy makers cannot react within the quarter to 
unexpected GDP shocks, we can use the estimated elasticity of primary surplus 
to GDP, 
, ( / )( / )s y ds dy y sα =  to fix the coefficient. If two variables are not 
assumed to be related at all within the quarter, the corresponding α will be set 
to 0; 
• using these elasticities, we can construct the cyclically-adjusted reduced-form 
primary surplus and debt residuals that are no longer correlated with the other 
structural shocks. Within an FTPL framework, the causation between surplus and 
debt is more from the former to the latter than the reverse. We thus assume that 
the instantaneous response of the surplus to a structural shock on debt 0sbβ = . 
Hence, the surplus structural shock is equal to the cyclically-adjusted primary 
surplus residual. Estimating the cyclically-adjusted debt residual on the surplus 
structural shock finally gives 
bsβ ; 
• the unexpected shocks, for which the theory and/or the institutional features 
make it impossible to rule out discretionary responses within the quarter, are 
estimated and the coefficients are denoted by 
,x yγ . Of course, the correlation 
between residuals and explanatory variables requires instrumental-variable 
estimation. 
These three steps permit to isolate different kinds of responses to innovations: 
elasticities give what can be labeled “automatic and immediate responses” to 
shocks; step 2 gives the “autonomous discretionary responses” of governments to a 
surplus unexpected innovation; and step 3 gives the “systematic and instantaneous 
discretionary responses” to structural shocks. In the case of the primary surplus, the 
“autonomous discretionary responses” can be considered as the economically 
correct response of the “cyclically-adjusted” part of the surplus to an innovation. 
In Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) methodology, the key to the identification 
procedure is that the use of quarterly data allows ruling out some instantaneous 
responses because of diffusion lags, as well as some discretionary responses because 
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of decision delays and policy implementation lags. With these assumptions and the 
knowledge of the non discretionary (automatic) component of the responses of some 
variables to unanticipated changes in others, it is possible to fix many non-diagonal 
elements of M1 to 0. Such is the case for the third equation in bloc (9): we assume 
that the responses of GDP to unanticipated changes in inflation and the interest rate, 
respectively, within the quarter can be set equal to 0 (i.e. 0ypiγ = ; 0yrγ = ). Doing so, 
it is possible to regress GDP on the primary surplus and public debt, taking the 
structural shocks on both as instruments.11 For the two remaining equations of bloc 
(9), we still use as instruments the structural shocks related to the explanatory 
variables. The induced structural shocks are then fully uncorrelated with the 
canonical VAR residuals. 
To sum up, the matrices M1 and M2 can be written as: 
 
1
1 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 1
sb sy
b br
ys yb
y
ry r
pi
pi
pi
α α
α α
γ γ
γ
γ γ
− − 
 
− − 
 
− −=
 
− 
 
− − 
M  (10) 
and: 
 
2
1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
bsβ
 
 
 
 =
 
 
 
 
M  (11) 
Fixing αsy and αsb allows for identification of es, the structural shock on the 
primary surplus, which is obtained by simple calculation, since the values of the 
residuals of the canonical VAR are known. Once αbpi  and αbr  have been fixed and 
es  is known we can estimate by OLS βbs and isolate the structural shock on debt eb in 
the equation of the canonical residual of the debt. We can then use es and eb as 
instruments in the third equation in order to obtain estimates for γys and γyb and the 
structural shock on activity ey. We do the same in the equation of the canonical 
residual of the inflation rate to estimate γpiy, and the structural shock on inflation rate 
epi, and in the fifth equation to estimate γry, and γrpi  and the structural monetary 
shock er. 
Elasticities of the public debt-to-GDP ratio resulted from OLS regressions 
vis-à-vis, alternatively, the interest rate and the inflation rate (all variables were 
————— 
11 We thus assume that structural fiscal shocks can have an immediate impact on GDP (residual): to motivate 
our choice, without relying exclusively on methodological convenience, we affirm that real variables have 
a more immediate impact on real variables than nominal ones. 
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expressed in first difference for elasticities’ calculations). Elasticities of the 
public-surplus-to-GDP ratio followed a two-step procedure: the primary surplus was 
separated between public expenditures (excluding interest payments) and tax 
receipts and both items were regressed vis-à-vis, alternatively, real GDP and the 
public-debt-to-GDP ratio. Finally, the elasticity of the primary surplus was equal to 
the corresponding weighted sum of the elasticity of tax receipts less that of public 
expenditures. 
Elasticities took the following values: 0.1syα = ; 
56.5·10sbα
−
= − ; 0.7bpα = − ; 
and 0.2biα =  syα  corresponds to the elasticity of the primary surplus in percent of 
GDP to GDP and should not be confused with that of the primary surplus to GDP 
(generally equal to 0.5 in the literature). If we consider the institutional features 
reported by Biau and Girard for France, their value for 
syα  can be confirmed.
12 
Second, the low elasticity of public debt vis-à-vis interest rate (within a quarter) is 
consistent with one important feature of French public debt, 80 per cent of which is 
issued at a fixed interest rate. Third, the relatively high elasticity of debt vis-à-vis 
inflation is also consistent with French debt’s institutional features: 95 per cent of 
this debt is non-indexed. Finally, the computation of an elasticity of the primary 
surplus to the public debt residual, rather than fixing it to zero, can be explained 
from two different perspectives. The less satisfactory one is technical: fixing 
sbα  to 
zero would give the FTPL interpretation of data an ex ante prominence that would 
bias ex post results. The other, more satisfactory, perspective relies on institutional 
information: the uncertainty surrounding debt financing quasi-automatically induces 
a stop in the program of public capital expenditures and has thus an effect on the 
primary surplus.13 In the present situation, it is straightforward to show that this 
effect is marginal: 
sbα  is almost zero. 
 
————— 
12 Biau and Girard consider that the elasticity of net receipts to GDP is equal to 0.8 while that of public 
expenditures is equal to 0 (real expenditures are not modified within a quarter): expressed in percent of 
GDP, it is straightforward that the net receipts ratio decreases less than the public expenditures ratio after 
GDP has grown; hence, the surplus increases in percent of GDP. 
13 In France, since the mid-Eighties, the “new public debt” is auctioned every month over the fiscal year, the 
program of these auctions for mid-term and long-term public bonds being decided at the end of the 
preceding fiscal year. This program of debt auction depends on planned public net borrowing and on 
planned capital amortization charges. Every month, the interest rate at which the auction has taken place is 
uncertain, depending on supply and demand, and so does capital amortization charges. Hence, although 
debt financing is planned in advance, the conditions at which it takes place give rise to monthly (and, in 
our case, quarterly) errors in the measurement of the real value of public debt. As a matter of fact, the 
French Treasury is fully aware of the quarterly cost of debt and can quasi-automatically compensate the 
increase (decrease) in the future streams of interest charges by a delay (acceleration) in the implementation 
of public capital expenditures. Note that the computed value of 
sbα  is sufficiently small to validate this 
mechanism. For a comprehensive survey of French public finances, see Llau (1996). 
652 Jérôme Creel, Paola Monperrus-Veroni and Francesco Saraceno 
 
4. Description of data 
The estimation period goes from 1978:1 to 2003:4. We use French quarterly 
national accounts from INSEE for gross domestic product and for primary surplus. 
French and German price consumer indexes and nominal short term (3-month) 
interest rates are obtained from DATASTREAM. Annual data for the stock of net 
liabilities come from the INSEE Balance Sheets; quarterly government net lending 
figures come from INSEE National Accounts; and quarterly data for net lending 
from the Financial Accounts of the Bank of France are used to construct a quarterly 
series of net financial liabilities. All variables have been seasonally adjusted by the 
original sources. Only GDP and main budget aggregates, notably operations on 
goods and services, are also adjusted for working days. Quarterly general 
government budget figures, as part of the ESA95 integrated system of National 
Accounts, are consistent with national income data. 
Real gross domestic product is the only variable deflated by the GDP deflator. 
We use the French consumer price index to deflate all French nominal series and the 
German consumer price index to obtain the real German interest rate. We have 
included a Maastricht dummy (DUMMA) starting from 1992:1 as well as a 
composite dummy (INTER), which is the product of the German interest rate and of 
DUMMA to take care of the interest rate convergence after 1993. Government 
primary surplus is obtained as the sum of government net lending and interest 
payments. The quarterly series for net financial liabilities from 1978 to 1994 is 
obtained by adding to the 1977 annual figure of the stock of net liabilities the 
quarterly observations on government net borrowing. For the 1995-2003 period, 
quarterly observations on the flow of net financial liabilities replace those on 
government net borrowing. There is a difference between the authentic annual series 
and the annual series stemming from this artificial quarterly series, in that in the 
1978-94 period information concerning revaluations and changes in volume of net 
liabilities is lost, since these items are omitted in government net borrowing 
observations from National Accounts. This difference has thus been calculated and 
then interpolated at quarterly frequency. It has been reattributed on a quarterly basis 
to the quarterly observations. The new artificial quarterly series thus obtained, when 
annualized, is consistent with the annual data from the INSEE Balance Sheets. This 
statistical artifice provides us with a quarterly series of government net financial 
liabilities containing more quarterly information than a simply interpolated series. 
Although not completely free from interpolation, French government series 
contain a considerable amount of quarterly information. On the expenditure side, 
almost all components of actual collective and individual consumption are calibrated 
using quarterly indicators. So are social transfers in kind. Social benefits other than 
transfers in kind are obtained by quarterly observations from social protection 
institutions. Seventy percent of public investment (construction) is made of 
genuinely quarterly series. As far as government receipts are concerned, social 
contributions are mainly genuinely quarterly data or calibrated by quarterly 
indicators. As a consequence, only some items on the government revenue side are 
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pure quarterly interpolations from annual data: business and net wealth taxes, rights 
on real property, and property income. 
The public finance variables are plotted in Figure 1. They reveal the general 
orientation of French fiscal policy since the late Seventies. They also shed light on 
the very close relationship between the primary surplus, net public debt and the real 
interest rate that thus gives peculiar importance to the above-mentioned model. 
It is well known that public deficits increased dramatically in the early 
Eighties since upon taking office in the spring of 1981, the new socialist government 
decided to reflate despite the so-called “external constraint” (that finally turned out 
to bite). It is interesting to note that although public deficits were soaring, primary 
surpluses increased dramatically and thus emphasized the key incidence of the 
sudden rise in interest charges on the overall fiscal stance of French fiscal policy in 
the early Eighties. The reversal to a stricter economic policy began in the summer of 
1982. The “tournant de la rigueur” (materialized in the execution of the budget after 
the spring 1983 third devaluation of the French Franc in the European Monetary 
System) resulted in a slow improvement of the primary-deficit-to-GDP ratio by the 
end of 1983. As fiscal consolidation became a declared objective of left- and 
right-wing policy makers over the period 1984-87, primary balance was almost 
achieved over this period. From 1989 to 1992, primary balances were continuously 
positive and the remaining overall public deficits of France were mainly due to 
growing real interest rates. The primary surplus worsened dramatically between 
1993 and 1995 mostly due to the recession of 1991-93 (real economic growth for 
1993 had been equal to –1.3 per cent). Since 1991, social security experienced a 
deficit (which represented 0.9 points of GDP in 1993). At the end of 1993, the 
public deficit ratio reached 6 per cent of GDP (i.e. twice the Maastricht 3 per cent 
limit), half of which could be attributed to the primary deficit. The next phase was 
characterized by fiscal consolidation in order to meet the Maastricht limit of the 3 
per cent of GDP. Since the end of 1994, fiscal policy turned to be strongly 
restrictive, resulting in sharp increase in the primary surplus, from –2 of GDP 1996 
to +2 per cent of GDP four years later. Between 2001 and 2004, however, fiscal 
policy has been less restrictive and the primary deficit in percent of GDP has 
reached the level of 1995, hence has erased the “convergence years”. 
As far as the public-debt-to-GDP ratio is concerned, it is noteworthy that its 
rise over the Eighties occurred despite the increase in the primary-surplus-to-GDP 
ratio. This leads to conclude that, the impact of the real interest rates on debt growth 
has been predominant. In the Nineties, the steep increase in the public-debt-to-GDP 
ratio coincided mainly with that of the primary deficits; only in the late Nineties did 
the relatively low real interest rates permit a decrease in the public-debt-to-GDP 
ratio. 
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Figure 1 
Public Finances and the Real Interest Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: INSEE and DATASTREAM. 
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5. Results 
Figure 2 displays the responses of the five endogenous variables to two 
different shocks: first a shock to se  equal to 1 percent of GDP; second a shock to re  
equal to 100 basis points. Like in Perotti (2004), the figure also displays the two 
symmetric one standard error bands computed by bootstrapping, as in Stock and 
Watson (2001). 
 
5.1 A fiscal shock 
The first outcome worth emphasizing is the negative significant impact of a 
positive surplus shock on GDP, from the second quarter after the shock has 
occurred. In fact, although the immediate response of the interest rate to the fiscal 
shock leads to a one-quarter long increase in GDP and prices, FTPL characteristics 
appear from the second quarter on. Two non-Keynesian episodes carrying no 
significance appear during the first 3 years, most surely driven by the fall in the 
interest rate. Nevertheless, afterwards FTPL properties prevail and non-Keynesian 
arguments can be disregarded for France. This negative impact increases in absolute 
value although at a decreasing rate from the sixth year after the shock has occurred. 
The effect continues to deploy in the longer run, remaining however quite low in 
absolute value. This confirms the Keynesian properties of fiscal policy in France 
that were the main conclusion of Biau and Girard. However, the fiscal multiplier 
that we obtain is lower than theirs. 
As could be expected from the theoretical framework, the wealth effect plays 
a crucial role in the long-lasting decrease in GDP: in fact, after the decrease in the 
real interest rate, the negative wealth effect is shown to have a more substantial 
impact on GDP than the usual positive private investment effect. The effect on 
output in the long run thus stems from the negative wealth effect which is itself 
consecutive to the sharp decrease in public debt. Origins of the latter are twofold: a 
temporary shock on the primary surplus and a decrease in the real interest rate. 
The incidence of the surplus shock on prices appears unable to reject the 
FTPL; after the instantaneous fiscal-induced pick up in prices, the price level adjusts 
to lower aggregate demand, inflates net public debt thus reestablishing the 
intertemporal budget balance. A new steady state with lower net debt and lower 
wealth justifies the persistence of a lower GDP. This result is relatively at odds with 
the conclusions of Creel and Le Bihan (2006) for France. In their paper, the VAR 
only incorporated the primary surplus and net debt (both expressed in percent of 
GDP) whereas the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies were not 
studied.1 This latter element might be crucial in the present context. As Figure 2 
shows, monetary policy loosens in the medium run, in response to the contractionary 
fiscal shock, and it surely has a positive impact on prices. 
————— 
1 Also noteworthy, Creel and Le Bihan (2006) do not use the same sample: data are on an annual basis and 
start in 1963. 
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Revealed substitutability in the behaviors of monetary and fiscal authorities in 
France, stemming from the fiscal shock, might seem quite amazing if we were trying 
to argue that both authorities have long worked hand in hand without conflict. The 
story is simpler: with the substantial rise in nominal and real interest rates that 
occurred in the Western countries during the Volcker’s era at the end of the 
Seventies and beginning of the Eighties, some countries like France implemented 
expansionary fiscal policy that were meant to cushion the negative impact on private 
consumption and investment that this monetary shock had provoked. As we show in 
Section 6, in the more recent years, most notably after the disinflation strategy had 
been launched and during the Maastricht convergence period, the “complementary 
behaviors” have disappeared and a new regime made up of fiscal contraction and 
relatively restrictive monetary policies has arisen. 
 
5.2 A monetary shock 
The most interesting response is that of GDP: we observe an immediate 
significant decrease in output until economic growth resumes two years after the 
shock, when the monetary shock has disappeared. However, an immediate increase 
in the price level is observed despite the fall in aggregate demand. The VAR 
monetary literature has long exhibited a puzzling phenomenon: following a positive 
innovation on the policy interest rate (here related to the real interest rate, rather than 
the nominal one, for reasons that have to do with the FTPL framework, see 
paragraph 3.1), the price level tends to increase rather than to decrease. According to 
Sims (1992), this so-called “price puzzle” arises due to an error in identifying the 
exogenous part of monetary policy. Without an indicator for future inflation among 
the endogenous variables of the VAR, the price rise following a positive shock on 
the nominal interest rate would appear as a normal response to higher expected 
inflation: what has been labeled an “exogenous monetary shock” in fact contains 
some portion of the endogenous response of monetary authorities to higher future 
(or expected) inflation. In order to circumvent the “puzzle”, Sims and others have 
suggested incorporating commodity prices as endogenous variables in VARs. Doing 
so, the truly exogenous component of monetary policy would be more accurately 
identified.2 It is noteworthy here that the “price puzzle” seems to be present in spite 
of the fact that the monetary policy shock is exogenous, thanks to the overall 
methodology which has been implemented. However, the price puzzle rapidly 
disappears and the pick up in GDP growth stems from the positive wealth effect that 
has resulted from the increase in net public debt; the latter after having immediately 
responded to the structural monetary shock and subsequently to the pick up in 
inflation, is finally driven by the fall in the price level. As in the case of a fiscal 
shock we observe a “coordination” of the fiscal and monetary authorities as a 
monetary restriction yields an immediate expansionary response of fiscal authorities, 
supporting growth until the positive effect of higher wealth takes over. 
————— 
2 Two recent contributions on the “price puzzle” have cast some doubts on the favourable incidence of 
introducing commodity prices in VARs (Giordani, 2004; Hanson, 2004). 
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Consistently with the predictions of the FTPL, public debt dynamics appear 
to react to the real interest rate and prices rather than to the evolution of the primary 
surplus: after a structural fiscal shock, the decrease in net debt is mainly driven by 
the immediate and sharp decrease in the real interest rate. Its upsurge, once the fiscal 
shock has disappeared, is led by the fall in prices. After a structural monetary policy 
shock, net debt decreases immediately while the primary deficit shows a persistent 
increase. The subsequent rise in net debt is led by the price movement while the 
primary deficit declines. 
 
6. Robustness 
In this section we perform a simple test to check the robustness of the results 
described in the previous section. We split our sample in two, the pre- and 
post-Maastricht periods, and we computed the impulse response functions 
corresponding to the two sub-samples. Table 1 shows how the computed elasticities 
changed. 
It is interesting to notice that the changes over the two sub-periods are 
substantial, and that they denote a change in policy. The Maastricht discipline shows 
in the sign of 
sbα , that, though extremely small in absolute value, changed from 
positive to negative. The sensitivity of the debt-to-GDP ratio to the interest rate went 
from large and positive to negative; the overall result is a small and positive value. 
Finally, the important swing of 
syα  reflects the institutional change intervened with 
the Maastricht treaty, when primary surplus became an objective rather than an 
instrument. 
Figures 3 and 4 show the impulse response functions computed for the two 
sub-samples. With respect to the complete sample, the optimal lag length passed 
from 5 to 4. Obviously, we dropped from the two regressions the Maastricht 
 
Table 1 
Computed Elasticities 
 
Sample all 1978-91 1992-2003 
syα  0.10 0.03 0.16 
bpiα  –0.69 –1.49 –0.31 
brα  0.22 3.27 –0.48 
sbα  –6.5·10
-5 3.3·10-4 –3.5·10–4 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3 
Impulse Response Functions for the First Sub-sample, 1978-91 
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Figure 4 
Impulse Response Functions for the Second Sub-sample, 1992-2003 
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dummy, so that the exogenous variables are the constant and the German interest 
rate.  
The results for the first sub-sample (1978-91) are that neither fiscal nor 
monetary policy shocks yield significant responses of the main macroeconomic 
variables. Two factors in our opinion contribute to explaining this result of policy 
ineffectiveness. The first is the high inflation environment of the late Seventies and 
early Eighties, that on one side made it very hard for fiscal and monetary authorities 
to design and implement efficient policy measures, and on the other made 
coordination harder to obtain. The second and in our opinion even more convincing 
explanation is that the process of European integration has progressively 
transformed the European Union in a large economy, in which policy has an 
important role to play. In the Eighties, on the other hand, such a process was just 
beginning, and even the largest European economies were strongly influenced by 
external factors. In that decade, in particular, the strong fluctuations of the dollar, 
and the US interest rates can explain most of the macroeconomic developments of 
the European economies (Fitoussi and Phelps, 1988). Thus, it is hardly surprising 
that national policies were not as effective as they had been when these economies 
were less open. 
As for the Maastricht years (1992-2003) the discourse is more complex. By 
looking at Figures 2 and 4 we can observe that the overall behaviour over this 
sub-sample is similar to that over the full sample, with two important differences. 
The first is the response of interest rates to fiscal shocks that shows how the 
substitutability between fiscal and monetary policy was reduced. In the full sample 
monetary policy loosens in the medium run, in response to a contractionary fiscal 
shock. This has the effect of softening the effects on GDP, even if at the price of a 
persistent effect on inflation. In the past decade, instead, monetary policy tended to 
reinforce the effects of fiscal shocks. Thus, while inflation was curbed, the loss in 
terms of output growth was more pronounced. The lower degree of coordination 
between fiscal and monetary policy also emerges from the response to monetary 
shocks. While in the full sample monetary restrictions yield an expansionary 
response of fiscal authorities, in the past decade this behaviour was disrupted by the 
fiscal rules introduced with the Maastricht Treaty. Many governments including 
France were forced to react to GDP slowdowns and to the ensuing degradation of 
the fiscal position by taking a tighter stance. Thus, the response of primary surplus 
to a contractionary monetary shock is unsurprisingly positive at least in the medium 
run. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper develops along the lines traced by a recent body of literature that 
tried to assess the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the economy. We tackled the 
issue from a new perspective, using as a background model the fiscal theory of the 
price level. It has allowed a richer structure than in the current literature, in 
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particular in what concerns the importance of wealth effects and of the strategic 
interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. 
In spite of this new and more complex setup, our paper is in line with the 
consensus that is emerging in the literature, in particular on the effects of fiscal 
policy shocks. On the one hand, our results confirm the standard textbook effects of 
fiscal expansions, though the size of the impulses should not be overstated. On the 
other hand, the impulse response functions of the structural VAR are consistent with 
the theoretical predictions of FTPL models, mainly as regards the positive link 
between the primary surplus and the price level. Moreover the wealth effect has 
been shown to work quite well and it facilitates the general understanding of the 
complex relationships between monetary policy, fiscal policy, net debt accumulation 
and GDP. 
Our analysis has concerned one of the largest European economies, France. 
Thus, the results carry a very strong political economy implication. The whole set of 
rules that governs the European Union has been designed based on the assumption 
that fiscal policy is largely ineffective, when not harmful; an assumption that is in 
line with the theoretical results that characterized the literature on non-Keynesian 
effects that developed along the Nineties, when the Treaties were debated and 
written. In light of the results presented in this paper and in the literature it refers to, 
the Stability and Growth Pact, that is designed to let at most automatic stabilization 
play a role, lacks an empirical foundation. 
On a more general level, the resurgence of interest in fiscal policy shows how 
dangerous are the attempts to crystallize in a constitutional framework the policy 
prescriptions that come from a particular doctrine. As our understanding of the 
mechanisms governing the economy deepens, the policy prescriptions and the tools 
best suited to face given shocks are also likely to change, so that the institutions in 
charge of governing the economy should be given the freedom to adapt to the new 
advances in economic theory. 
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